When Banking Apps Are Broken From Within

Overlooked API vulnerabilities like Broken Object Level Authorization, Mass Assignment, and Insecure Direct Object References slip past security checks

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Interesting Tech Fact:

In 1994, one of the earliest online banking services in the U.S., known as Stanford Federal Credit Union Online Banking, unknowingly revealed how fragile digital trust could be. The system allowed users to access their accounts via a simple web interface, but its first version transmitted passwords in plain text over unsecured connections. Hackers who knew how to intercept early web traffic could capture login credentials with ease. Although no catastrophic breach was ever publicized, the oversight was a wake-up call for the industry—showing that even pioneers of online banking underestimated the risks of weak encryption. This incident directly influenced the adoption of SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) in financial services, a standard that became the backbone of secure online transactions worldwide.

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